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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY: A MATTER OF TIMING

AND LOCATION
J.B. Ruhit
For all the controversy surrounding the effect of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA") on private property, precious little information has
accompanied the heated calls for strengthening or weakening the law's
land use proscriptions. Preservationist groups and property rights groups
alike depend on staking out higher moral ground and producing "poster
child" stories of imperiled species or property owners. The Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS"), which implements the ESA for most of the
listed endangered and threatened species, has compiled reams of data on
its administrative functions' in support of its recent efforts through administrative (in lieu of legislative) reform to achieve the elusive "balance" between too much and too little land use regulation. 2 Most of this
debate takes for granted that landowners threaten species and that the
ESA threatens landowners. By and large, however, not much is known
in terms of hard, cold data about the effects of ESA regulation on landt Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and Visiting Associate
Professor of Law (1998-99), George Washington University Law School. I am grateful to
Professor Jeffrey J. Rachlinski for the opportunity to comment on his work, to the Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy for the opportunity to participate in their Symposium, and to
the other participants in the Symposium for their invaluable insights on the issue of endangered species and private property.
1 In a prior article, Rachlinski summarizes and analyzes many of these data. See Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, Noah By the Numbers: An EmpiricalEvaluation of the EndangeredSpecies Act,
82 ComRNELL L. Rav. 356 (1997). For other empirically-oriented studies of the FWS's ESA
implementation programs, see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 277
(1993); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with Habitat ConservationPlansand Suggestionsfor Streamlining the Process,23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MiNN. L. Rv. 1171 (1998); Barton S. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies
Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305 (1997). FWS's sister
agency in administration of the ESA is the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), which has jurisdiction over marine and anadromous species. See
Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, As Amended, 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.01(b) (1996). Because of the Symposium's focus on the ESA and land regulation, my
focus herein is exclusively on FWS programs.
2 For a summary of the FWS's reform initiatives, see J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress?
An Agendafor Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J.
367 (1998).
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owner behavior, and scarcely more is known in that form about the ef3
fects of landowner behavior on imperiled species.
Jeffrey Rachlinski should thus be applauded for undertaking his
legal empirical study of the relationship between the level of land use
4
regulation and the level of landowner participation in species protection.
The approach he has taken-of using plants as the case study for learning how landowners might respond to reduced land use regulation on
behalf of animal species-is truly creative. As he explains, the ESA protects listed animal species virtually everywhere, from any harmful act, by
anyone. 5 The ESA protects listed plants found on federal land broadly,
and prohibits federal agencies from jeopardizing listed plants regardless
of their location; however, plants on property not subject to federal control or to federal action are virtually unprotected under the ESA unless
state law extends some measure of safe harbor.6 Since states vary in the
3 On a gross scale, the loss of habitat to real estate is unquestionably an important factor
in species endangerment. One recent study has found that 85% of imperiled species included
in one study were affected by habitat loss, with land conversion for commercial and residential
uses being the leading contributor. See David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BioScIENca 607, 609-12 (1998). Moreover, the prevalence of a risk species on nonfederal lands increases the importance of policies toward private
land development. One study estimates that over 90% of the species listed under the Endangered Species Act as endangered or threatened have some, or all, of their habitat on nonfederal
lands-73% of those have over 60% of their habitat on nonfederal lands, and 37 percent are
completely dependent on nonfederal lands. See U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., Pua No. GAO/RCED95-16, ENDANGERED SPECIEs ACT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECrMoN ON NONFEDERAL

LANDS 4-5 (1994) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF.]. Another study demonstrates that a
mere seven percent of the land area of the United States is home to fully 50% of plant and
animal species listed under the Endangered Species Act, and that the "hot spots," within which
many different at-risk species appear in clusters, are often located near areas experiencing
suburban expansion. See Amy Ando et al., Species Distributions,Land Values, and Efficient
Conservation, 279 Sci. 2126 (1998); Curtis H. Flather et al., Threatened and Endangered
Species Geography,48 BIOSCIENcE 365 (1998); A.P. Dobson et al., GeographicDistribution
of Endangered Species in the United States, 275 Sci. 550 (1997); T. Adler, Mapping Out
EndangeredSpecies' Hot Spots, 150 Sci. NEws 101 (1996); Jon Paul Rodriguez et al., Where
are Endangered Species Found in the United States?, ENDANGERED SPEcIEs UPDATE, Mar.Apr. 1997, at 1. More precise, species-by-species analyses with which to evaluate landowner
behaviors by type of landowner, type of land use, and magnitude of impact are not widely
available.
4 See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Protecting Endangered Species Without Regulating Private
Landowners: The Case ofEndangered Plants, 8 CoR'mu J. L & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1998). This
is actually the second of Professor Rachlinski's probing empirical analyses of the ESA. See
Rachlinski, supra note 1.
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). For an overview of the take prohibition as
implemented, see Albert Gidari, The EndangeredSpecies Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private
Landowners, 24 ENvTL. L. 419 (1994); Frederico Cheever, An Introductionto the Prohibition
Against Takings in Section 9 of the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973: Learning to Live With A
Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 109 (1991).
6 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B). For an overview of the protection of plants under the
ESA, see George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening ofAmerican Law?:
The Recent Evolution of FederalLaw for PreservingFloralDiversity, 27 NAT. REsouRcEs J.
247 (1987).
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level of protection they afford plants, plants are left with a wide spectrum
of possible levels of protection based on, among other things, the status
of the property owner. By aiming his empirical analysis at the question
of how species status and property owner status correlate under different
regimes of regulatory protection, Rachlinski has provided a rare example
of legal empiricism under the ESA that is focused on the important question of how landowners respond to ESA land use regulation.
This article's comments on Rachlinski's work fall into three categories. First, as any empirical analysis is only as good as the questions it
seeks to answer, I focus on the question Rachlinski poses as his research
issue. He draws from the rhetoric associated with the ESA debate in
observing that "[c]ritics of the ESA also contend that many private landowners would voluntarily conserve species on their property but for the
prospect of regulation by the federal government. The critics conclude
'7
from this analysis that this aspect of the ESA should be eliminated."
Rachlinski puts these critics to the test using the endangered plants
model to explore the question of whether eliminating land use regulation
as a feature of the ESA would help or hinder animal species. While his
work fairly silences the critics' broadside attack on the ESA, they represent an extreme and minority position with respect to ESA reform,
notwithstanding how much attention they receive from the media and
8
Congress.
By contrast, the administrative reforms the FWS has implemented
in recent years, with increasingly bipartisan support, represent the middle
ground between eliminating land use restrictions and maintaining the status quo. 9 These FWS reforms attempt to ameliorate the inherent unfairness that the ESA works on some landowners. To so much as suggest
that the ESA is often unfair in application sends many environmentalists
into distress, but Rachlinski's study offers an excellent opportunity to
show that although the ESA often is unfair to landowners, we should not
repeal its land use restrictions. Instead, the appropriate response would
be to identify the conditions leading to the ESA's unfairness and attack
them without diluting the overarching species conservation objective of
the Act.
My second category of comments focuses on the importance of field
testing empirical findings derived from statistical studies. As much as I
applaud Rachlinski's foray into legal empirical analysis of the ESA, I am
concerned by the casual treatment so-called anecdotal evidence receives
7 Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 2.

8 See Roger Platt, Ships Passing in the Night: Current Prospectsfor Reauthorization of
the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 3, 5-6 (discussing the supporters and critics of a bipartisan Senate ESA reform bill).
9 See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 370-74.
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in his work, for it is largely (perhaps only) through such evidence that we
can identify unfairness issues in the ESA. Data without theory are just
data, and theories without data are just theories. Rachlinski has done us
the service of beginning to test an advocated theory (removing land use
restrictions will improve landowner actions toward species) with hard
data (showing mostly the opposite). But the job does not end there, as
conclusions from that process must be confirmed in the field through
serious case study research. In this sense, the difference between anecdotes and case studies is largely in the eyes of the beholder. Call them
by either name, but real world experiences, provided they are accurately
recorded, must not be ignored in the process of developing theories about
cause and effect. As someone who has had extensive first-hand experience with landowner responses to ESA regulation, 10 I feel well-qualified
to relate some "anecdotes" demonstrating that the ESA, in some circumstances, is unfair to landowners and leads directly to landowner behavior
counterproductive to the species conservation goal. My experience
would confirm Rachlinski's basic conclusion that landowners generally
will not voluntarily engage in higher levels of species protection in a
completely deregulated land use regime, but the exceptions must be recognized and, ideally, integrated into the theory.
My third category of comments collects and refutes some of the
arguments extreme property rights advocates are likely to advance in
criticism of Rachlinski's work. The bane of all empirical research is the
ease with which critics can nit-pick it to death. There are some obvious
points Rachlinski's critics might raise in that regard-e.g., plants are not
animals, so conclusions about plants don't apply to animals-but I will
demonstrate that most of them are inconsequential to his basic conclusion and to the quality of his study. As a result, advocates-of the wholesale "free market" version of species protection will have a difficult time
dismissing the implications of his work.
My three categories of comments on Rachlinski's empirical study
are directed at my central operating thesis on the issue of the ESA and
private property-that the unfairness the ESA causes to landowners is
isolated rather than systemic, that it can be remedied through targeted
solutions, and that it does not support wholesale repeal of the take prohibition. In the end, Rachlinski explodes the myth extreme property rights
advocates have used to advocate gutting the ESA-that private, voluntary landowner initiative will more than fill the species protection vac10 While in private law practice in Austin, Texas during the 1980s and early 1990s, I
represented many private and local government landowners and developers in connection with
ESA compliance, permitting, and enforcement issues. For a summary of the ESA issues affecting Austin during that time period, see J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservationand the EverExpanding Web of FederalLaws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Com-

pletely Different?, 66 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 555, 635-42 (1995).
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uum created once the ESA's land use regulations disappear. 1 ' But does
his work support keeping the status quo intact, or strengthening the
ESA's land use restrictions, as many preservationists advocate? A careful empirical analyst, Rachlinski does not suggest that the data point
either way for those questions. However, I suggest that my "anecdotes"
call the status quo and, even more so, the preservationists' vision of a
supercharged ESA, into serious question. Perhaps in the long run Rachlinski and I are headed towards the same point from different perspectives, which is also where the FWS administrative reform agenda has
been headed: keeping a strong component of land use regulation in the
ESA, but providing the flexibility to tailor land use proscriptions to the
timing and location of species and landowners. After all, timing and
location are most important to both species and landowners.
I. DEFINING THE RIGHT RESEARCH QUESTION:
ACKNOWLEDGING THE MIDDLE GROUND
Rachlinski develops his null hypothesis-the proposition that his
empirical study is designed to test-based on positions taken by critics of
the ESA's command and control framework. No one could reasonably
argue that the ESA is not a classic example of the command and control
approach to environmental regulation; 12 the question is whether that approach works as intended. Rachlinski observes that critics "argue that
the restrictions are unfair to landowners and convert them from potential
allies of endangered species into potential enemies.... The critics conclude ... that this aspect of the ESA should be eliminated."' 13 From
there, his research proposal proceeds to outline the two possible outcomes of following that proposed reform: removing the ESA's land use
restrictions will either make harboring protected species less costly to
landowners and "inspire them to preserve important habitat voluntarily
[or] .... such reform would free landowners to destroy habitat needed
for the survival of endangered species."' 14 His study explores which is
the most likely outcome, and handily seems to point in the direction of
the latter.
11 See, e.g.,Endangered Species Recovery and Conservation Incentive Act of 1995, H.R.
2364, 104th Cong. (proposing to replace the existing ESA regulatory structure with an incentive-based voluntary conservation framework); David A. Ridenour, To Save Wildlife, Scrap the
EndangeredSpecies Act, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1995, at A12 ("true reform" would involve

"scrapping the ESA altogether and replacing it with a voluntary, incentive-based system");
JOHN MERRFmLD & DucGAN FLANAKN, A MARKET APPROACH TO PROTECTING HABITAT FOR
ENDANGERED SPEcIES

(1995).

12 The ESA has been described by environmentalists and property rights advocates alike
as the "pit bull" of environmental laws. See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pitbull Goes to
School ENvTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 55.
13 Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 2.
14 Id
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My concern at this point is not with Rachlinski's dismantling of the
theory that eliminating the ESA will increase landowner actions on behalf of species. Indeed, in Part II of my comments I use what I believe
are the narrow exceptions to his conclusion to demonstrate that, in general, he correctly assesses the likely landowner response to total ESA
deregulation. Rather, at this point I want to be sure that it is clear exactly
which criticism of the ESA is under study, for "the critics" of the ESA
are a diverse crowd. Those who argue that the ESA is often unfair to
landowners include many, such as me, who would not go to the next
quantum level to say that the elimination of the ESA's land use restrictions will result generally in more landowner protection of endangered
species.' 5 Rachlinski's work should silence the latter group of critics,
but I don't believe that he has done enough to undermine the former
group. The ESA is often unfair to landowners.
The ESA's unfairness surfaces in many ways, usually concerning
the inherent unfairness possible whenever landowners' fate depends on
timing and location. For example, when land development is a major
contributing cause of a species' endangerment, those landowners lucky
enough to have developed before the species is listed, and whose land
uses thus led to the listing, escape all regulation. However, the poor
souls that intentionally or inadvertently left the species' habitat on their
lands shoulder the post-listing regulatory burden.' 6 Moreover, to the extent we justify the ESA on the ground of the collective benefits species
offer to humans (medicines, aesthetic pleasure, ecosystem functions,
etc.), the costs of species protection tends to fall on a much narrower
17
subgroup of society than those who derive the benefits.
I can label these features of the ESA unfair without having to advocate the complete elimination of the ESA's land use restrictions. But
many environmentalists, passionately convinced that the ESA is morally
good, have a hard time conceiving that it can also be unfair. Others
simply won't admit the unfairness, believing it would concede too much
to the property rights advocates. Yet clearly the Act does work in the
way I have just outlined. So, we get pages and pages in law reviews
devoted to articulating elegant theories of the evolution of property
15 See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 2, at 388-400 (describing the FWS's efforts, generally
supported in the regulated community, to ameliorate unfairness to landowners under the ESA

without altering the basic regulatory framework); Platt, supra note 8, at 5-6 (discussing the
broad support a recent Senate bipartisan ESA reform bill has received among the regulated
community notwithstanding that it retains the take prohibition and other ESA regulatory
programs).
16 This perverse pre-listing conservation disincentive is what prompted the FWS to adopt
a new policy to promote and reward landowners' pre-listing conservation efforts. See Ruhl,
supra note 2, at 384-86.
17 The ESA prohibits species listing decisions based on economic impacts. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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rights, the ethical duties of landowners to the land, and so on-much of it
with the purpose of convincing audiences that the ESA is not unfair, or at
least that its unfairness should be overlooked., These arguments are not
convincing. The fact that the ESA is morally good does not mean we
cannot make it morally better, and we can do so by focusing on its inherent unfairness to landowners. If we can figure out a way to ameliorate
the ESA's unfairness to landowners and still retain or improve its protective value for species, why not do so?
Returning the focus to Rachlinski's work, I do not want to give the
impression that I believe he is trying to push the unfairness issue under
the table. His study very carefully targets the "eliminate the ESA" hypothesis and does not purport to say that the ESA is fair in all its applications. My concern is simply with the way he has developed the study's
null hypothesis-lumping the "unfairness" criticism in with the "eliminate the ESA" criticism as if one has to believe both if one believes
either. More to the point, my concern is that others will use his study to
deflect the unfairness criticism, when I believe the only fair interpretation of the study is that it deflates the broad deregulation position. In
short, he has shown us that we have a pretty good mousetrap in the ESA,
but that leaves open the question of how to build a better one.
II.

AFTER THEORY AND DATA MERGE: ACCOUNTING FOR
REAL WORLD EXPERIENCES

Confronting the unfairness inherent in the ESA, and the challenge
of weeding it out without diluting the ESA's salutary species conservation goal, leads directly to my next category of comments on Rachlinski's work. Ir'addition to moral goodness, one of the rallying points of
passionate ESA supporters is the theme of a "diversity of life" which
must be maintained in order for healthy, functional ecosystems to continue to support species, including homo sapiens.'9 As a devotee of com18 See, e.g., James P. Karp, A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing Our

Land Ethic, 23 ENvrL. L. 735 (1993). I do not mean to suggest that questions of evolving
property rights and land ethic are not important, or that all or even most treatments of them are
guilty of trying to cover up the unfairness issue, but few deal with the unfairness issue for what
it is-an inherent outcome of changing property rights rules. Further, many lump the unfairness criticism of command and control style land use regulation in with the wild-eyed, Libertarian, property rights assault on the ESA and its kin. Indeed, a number of prominent
"environmentalist" legal commentators are beginning to confront the unfairness issue in environmental law honestly, directly, and with a sobering message to all environmentalists that
continuing to ignore or write around the unfairness issue risks allowing environmental laws
like the ESA to lose all their moral force. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Fairnessin Environ-

mental Law, 27 ENvrL. L. 705 (1997).
19 See Holly Doremus, Patchingthe Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 265-68 (1991); James Drodzdowski, Saving an Endangered
Act: The Casefor a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. REs. L.

REv. 553, 556 (1995); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Manage-
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plex adaptive systems theory, I couldn't agree more, and I have
contended elsewhere that land use practices often undercut the diversity
of ecosystems with effects we cannot fully predict or understand pre20
cisely because ecosystems are themselves complex adaptive systems.
But equally true is the reality that the law must recognize the diversity
that is out there and be ready to adapt and evolve simultaneously. The
ESA is an apt illustration of the difficulties in that regard, for there is
simply no one recipe for how to manage all endangered species, or all
imperiled ecosystems, or all different assemblages of the "diversity of
life."
Thus, the very diversity of life poses a problem for Rachlinski and
anyone else who hopes to divine truth about the ESA through empirical
analysis. Every species is different, and we run a risk when we attempt
to generalize from macro-data analyses, even when using the subcategories of landowner status and regulatory protection levels as Rachlinski
does. In short, we cannot hope to provide universal answers about the
ESA's effect on species or landowners from studies that lump the universe of species and landowners into one empirical database. Rachlinski's work generally supports the view that less land use regulation will
not lead to more landowner protection of species, and perhaps goes so far
as to support the preservationists' view that more land use regulation
could prompt (i.e., force) more landowner protection of endangered spement, 81 MINN. L. REv. 869, 959 (1997); Ruhl, supra note 10, at 570-72. For a summary of
the ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation policy formulation initiatives of
eighteen federal agencies, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EcosYsTEm MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL AGENcY AcrVIms, CRS REP. NO. 94-339 (1994). Ecosystem management
and biodiversity conservation are now standard fare of environmental groups' policy propos-

als. See, e.g., BioDrIvERsrrY AND THE LAW (William Snape II et al. eds., 1996) ('The assumption in this book is that biodiversity, and lots of it, should be conserved and preserved by
law."); Tim KEYSTONE CENTER, Tim KEYsToNE NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON ECOsYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: FINAL REPORT (1996); STEvEN YAFFEE ET AL., Tim WILDERNESS SociETY,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN Tim UNITED STATES: AN AssESsMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE

(1996). For differing views on this new paradigm of conservation policy, compare R. Edward
Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?,8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 35 (1994) (advo-

cating movement towards this approach), and R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on "What is
Ecosystem Management?" 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 47 (1997) (same), with Rebecca

W. Thomson, "Ecosystem Management" Great Idea, But What Is It, Will It Work, and Who
Will Pay?, 9 NAT. REsoURCFs & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 42 (pointing out difficulties of the
approach).
20 See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of EnvironmentalLaw as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the EnvironmentBy Making a Mess of EnvironmentalLaw, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933,

935-36 (1997); see also Fred Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 Cm-KENT L. REv. 847, 869-73 (1994); William
H. Rodgers, Jr., Adaptation of Environmental Law to the Ecologists' Discovery of Dise-

quilibria, 69 Cm.-KENr L. REv. 887, 891 (1994); A. Dan Tarlock; The NonequilibriumParadigm in Ecology and the PartialUnraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv.

1121, 1128-44 (1994); Jonathan B. Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories,
and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 355-56 (1995).
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cies. Neither proposition, however, will be true for all species or for all
landowners.
I do not have an elaborate empirical study to support my assertions
in this article. Rather, I have only the much-maligned "anecdote," except
that, unlike many anecdotes which involve more lore than fact, these
anecdotes are taken directly from my experiences. These are anecdotes
that have been repeated, albeit with different species and landowners as
the players, on sufficiently numerous occasions and in sufficiently numerous congressional districts to capture the attention of politicians and,
more importantly, the current FWS administration. 2 1 The anecdotes
come in three varieties, each exposing a perverse potential for the ESA to
work counterproductively to its goals by imposing more, rather than less,
regulation of land use.
My three anecdotes involve the black-capped vireo, a 4.5-inch insect-eating migratory songbird whose habitat territory during nesting sea22
son ranged from Kansas to Mexico, but it now nests mainly in Texas.
Vireos typically nest in shrub lands with vegetation extending from the
ground to about six feet and covering about thirty to sixty percent of the
total area, with nesting territories ranging in size from one to sixteen
acres. 23 Fire was the vireo's friend, for it ensured a steady supply of new
shrub land as former nesting territory gradually converted into mature
woodlands suitable for another endangered songbird, the golden-cheeked
warbler.24 Brush clearing, fire suppression, and browsing by deer and
livestock slowly diminished the vireo's available habitat, leading to its
listing as an endangered species in 1987.25 To the list of causes of the
species' decline, however, I would add the ESA itself.
First, in the months leading up to the listing of the vireo-as the
possibility of listing was announced and the listing was proposed-some
landowners approached me because they were concerned that the listing
could impede their land use plans. Even if they had no particularly welldefined plans, and even before any concrete ESA restrictions were defined, they were smart enough to sense that life as a landowner without
vireo habitat would be easier than life with vireo habitat. I was asked on
21 See Michael J. Bean, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Private Land: Four Lessons
Learnedfrom the Past Quarter Century, 28 ENvmL. L. REP. 10,701, 10,706-07 (1998) (recounting several such anecdotes as having provided support for administrative reforms).
There is no evidence that the FWS relied on quantitative statistical analyses to develop the
support for and framework of the various programs the agency has designed to ameliorate the
unfairness that the ESA poses to landowners. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 372-73, 388-89.
22 See LiNDA CAMPBELL, ENDANGERED Am THRATEN ANiMALS OF TEXAs: THm
Lim, IsToRY AND MANAGEmENT 29 (1995).
23 See id,
24 See id. at 30.
25 See iL
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several occasions whether the ESA restricts clearing of vireo habitat or,
26
more radically, killing of vireos before the species is listed. It does not.
Second, during the years following listing of the species, as the
FWS disseminated information about the species, the whereabouts of its
habitat, and the natural progression of vegetation into and out of habitat
suitable for vireos, owners of land that had traditionally been grazed or
otherwise managed in a regime that was pre-emergent to suitable vireo
habitat learned that they would preserve more land use options by keeping their land in that condition-something that could be done simply
through periodic clearing or running a few goats on their property. Likewise, owners of land with suitable vireo habitat learned that in a few
years it would magically grow out of that suitability and could be cleared
without impact to vireos. On many occasions I was asked whether the
ESA prevents private landowners from engaging in either practice. It
does not. 27
Third, owners of land containing occupied or suitable vireo habitat
and whose plans involve immediate development face an ambiguous regulatory framework. Vireos winter in Central America, and it is often
difficult to know what effects a specific development in or near suitable
habitat will have on particular members of the species. 2 8 If development
is timed during the winter, or is designed to avoid intrusion into clearly
occupied areas, it may be difficult for the FWS or anyone else to prove
an illegal "take" has occurred. 29 On the other hand, some landowners
observed the way that other landowners who "did the right thing" and
sought FWS authorization for developments in or near vireo habitat fared
under the ESA's permit regime. 30 The permit process experience for
many was long and expensive, often substantially altering the develop26 The "take" prohibition applies only to animal species listed as endangered, or as
threatened if FWS also extends the take protection to the species, but offers no protection prior
to either such listing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
27 Actions that promote recovery of a species-i.e., conservation actions-are required
of federal agencies, but not of state, local, and private entities unless their actions are either
funded or authorized by a federal agency or would result in taking of a listed species and thus
require a permit under ESA section 10(a)(1)(B). See J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New"
EndangeredSpecies Act. Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of FederalAgen-

cies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENvr.. L. 1107, 1121-25 (1995).
28 The general threats to the species appear to be sufficiently defined, but "[r]esearch is
underway to better understand the.., land management practices affecting the black-capped
vireo." CAMPBEL, supra note 22, at 31.

29 To prove "take" as a result of habitat destruction or modification, a person would have
to provide evidence that the action proximately and foreseeably led to the death or injury of
identifiable species members. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 696-97 n.9 (1995).
30 For a discussion of the so-called habitat conservation plan ("HCP") permitting program, which is administered under section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)
(1994), see Lin, supra note 1.
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ment design. 31 Thus, I was asked whether landowners have a duty to
consult with the FWS before engaging in development, and whether a
particular development plan designed to avoid significant destruction of
vireo habitat could withstand allegations of an illegal take. The answers,
respectively, are no32 and usually yes. 33 Therefore, the ESA can be unfair to species too. Once again, it's a matter of timing and location.
I expect many ESA supporters will point to the landowners I describe above (and their lawyers) as the problem for the vireo. Indeed, the
FWS claims that "[landowners can help [the vireo] by... incorporating
'34
management practices which create or maintain habitat for these birds."
Sure they can, but why should we expect them to and then deride them
when they do not do so? Landowners in the three scenarios I have described did not voluntarily protect the vireo because to have done so
would have been contrary to their economic self-interest. The ESA is a
powerful regulatory tool to coerce landowner protection of endangered
species, but it has its loopholes that landowners are quite adept at finding, as my experience illustrates. Furthermore, the three scenarios I describe above will not easily be rectified through increased regulatory
clout: there will always be some point before which the regulation does
not apply and thus when landowners will be free to destroy a species'
habitat. No regulatory regime can force all landowners to allow their
land to evolve or devolve into habitat for a species, and no regulation can
be drafted so airtightly that it captures all activities that may transgress
the regulation's species protection goal. But if the solution to the
problems posed by these scenarios is not more regulation, what is it?
Enter the FWS's reform agenda.
The FWS has realized that the breadth of the ESA's proscriptive
approach is not matched by any proactive component to deal with the
scenarios that fall through the command and control cracks. Section
7(a)(1) of the ESA imposes an affirmative duty only on federal agencies
to conserve species, 35 whereas the biological reality is that most endangered species rely heavily on state and private lands for their essential
habitat.3 6 Nonfederal entities are obligated to employ conservation ef31

See id. at 402.

See Ruh1, supra note 27.
The burden of proof established in the Sweet Home case, while not insurmountable, is
difficult to prove for many species, such as migratory songbirds. See 515 U.S. at 696-97 n.9.
For example, the FWS has never commenced formal administrative, civil, or criminal enforcement proceedings alleging illegal destruction of vireo habitat.
34 CAMPBELL, supra note 22, at 31.
35 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)(1994); see also supra note 27.
36 One study estimates that over 90% of the species listed under the ESA as endangered
or threatened have some or all of their habitat on nonfederal lands. See U.S. GEN. Accr. O-F.,
supra note 3, at 4. Of those species, 73% have over 60% of their habitat on nonfederal lands
and 37% are completely dependent on nonfederal lands. See id. at 5. Another study demon32
33
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forts only when they seek authorization to take endangered species,
37
which is provided through the permitting procedures of section 10(a).
It has become increasingly apparent, therefore, that some mechanism to
bring about broader and more proactive nonfederal conservation efforts
is needed. Moreover, the glaring deficiency of the ESA is in its absence
of any measure, proscriptive or proactive, on behalf of species before
they become endangered. Until a species is listed as endangered or
threatened under section 4, none of the ESA's land use restrictions and
38
conservation benefits are available.
Through a series of recently announced policy proposals, the FWS
has made significant strides toward filling in the loopholes in the statutory scheme, and has done so in ways uncharacteristic of the heavyhanded approach of the core ESA programs. The three policies, known
as Candidate Conservation Agreements ("CCAs"), Safe Harbors, and No
Surprises, have the potential to create a seamless spectrum of mechanisms available to the agency and landowners. These mechanisms are
intended to address species conservation beginning long before a species
39
is listed and continuing long thereafter.
The CCA policy, still in draft form as of this writing, creates "voluntary programs that encourage non-federal landowners to implement
proactive conservation measures for these declining species." 40 The
agencies will enter into a CCA with a nonfederal landowner if they condlude that the conservation measures, if adopted by similarly situated
property owners in the covered species' range, will avoid the need for
listing. In return, the agencies will provide the landowner with assurances (through a section 10(a) permit) that the landowner may implement
planned land uses in the future should the species become listed notwithstanding the CCA.4 1 Whereas the landowner previously might have
"managed" the property in such a way as to avoid the emergence of
habitat and other conditions beneficial to unlisted species, CCAs create a
very real incentive to do just the opposite.
strates that a mere seven percent of the land area of the United States is home to fully 50% of
plant and animal species listed under the ESA, and that the "hot spots," which contain clusters

of at risk species, are often located near areas experiencing suburban expansion. See A.P.
Dobson et al., supra note 3; T. Adler, supra note 3; Jon Paul Rodriguez et al., supranote 3, at

1.
37 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994); see also supra note 27.
38 See supra note 26. This toggle-switch approach is responsible for the pre-listing species conservation disincentives that the ESA causes, and that the FWS has sought to reverse
through several of its administrative reform policies. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 384.
39 For a more detailed summary of these three reform initiatives, see Ruhl, supra note 2,
at 384-87, 392-94, 397-400.
40 Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg.
32, 183,32,183-84 (1997) (proposed June 12, 1997).
41 See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg.
32,189, 32,192-93 (1997) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 17.22) (proposed June 12, 1997).
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Applying the same reasoning to listed species, the Safe Harbor policy, also still in draft form, removes the interest landowners have in
preventing their land from becoming home to listed species. Under the
Safe Harbor policy, the FWS and the NMFS are "providing an incentive
to property owners to restore, enhance, or maintain habitats resulting in
net conservation benefit to endangered and threatened species." 42 Landowners who improve conditions for listed species under a Safe Harbor
Agreement will receive a permit under section 10(a). These permits provide assurance that the landowners may implement land uses in the future so long as those uses do not degrade a species' population and
habitat below baseline levels in existence on the property before the Safe
Harbor Agreement was adopted. 43
Sometimes a land use requires the taking of listed species that are
not the subject of a CCA or a Safe Harbor Agreement. Section 10(a)
requires that the FWS authorize such takes if they are incidental to lawful
activities and if the landowner adopts a habitat conservation plan
("HCP") outlining efforts to avoid, minimize, and mitigate adverse effects on the species. 44 Recognizing that HCPs offer viable conservation
opportunities, notwithstanding the authorization of take inherent in the
permitting function, the FWS and the NMFS recently adopted regulatory
amendments using an assurances approach similar to that adopted under
the CCAs and Safe Harbor policies. 45 According to the agencies' rules,
HCP permittees will receive assurances that no increased financial burden will be placed on the permittee should unforeseen circumstances
with regard to the covered species require increased conservation efforts
after the HCP is issued.4 6 In other words, the FWS or the NMFS will
assume that burden.
42 Announcement of Draft Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178, 32,178-79 (1979)
(proposed June 12, 1997).

43 See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, at 32,191-92
(1997) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 17.22) (proposed June 12, 1997).
44 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). For policy discussions of an HCP permit program written when it was emerging, see Robert D. Thornton, Searchingfor Consensus and
Predictability:Habitat Conservation Planning Under the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 21
ENVTL. L. 605 (1991); J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endan-

gered Species Act: Pushing the Practicaland Legal Limits of Species Protection, 44 Sw. L.J.
1393 (1991). For more current policy discussions having the benefit of several years' experience of program inplementation, see DEFENDERs oF WnmLaE, FRAYED SAFETY NaErs (1998);
Barton H. Thompson, The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49
STAN. L. REv. 305 (1997); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with Habitat Conservation
Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 EcoLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); Eric
Fisher, Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: No Surprises and

the Questfor Certainty, 67 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 371 (1996).
45 See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (" No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859
(1998) (amending 50 C.F.R. pts. 17, 222).
46 See id.
at 8871.
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The need for and promise of the CCA, Safe Harbor, and No Surprises policies is not immediately apparent from Rachlinski's empirical
study because they respond to the diversity of life and living under the
ESA. Generalizations about species and landowners don't reveal the dynamics that lead to the three scenarios in which the ESA works againstnot for-species conservation. Rachlinski is probably correct in surmising that "situations in which the FWS's land-use restrictions do more
harm than good to a listed species are probably the exception, not the
norm." 47 But why should there be any such situations? In short,
although Rachlinski drives a stake through the heart of the property
rights extremists' theory that repealing the ESA will unleash countless
voluntary landowner conservation practices, his data do not account for
what happened to the vireo and, I believe, present no reason to dissuade
the FWS from pursuing its limited reform agenda, so long as it remains
targeted at the kinds of behavior my anecdotes suggest is occurring all
too frequently and unnecessarily.
III.

RESPONDING TO NIT-PICKING: THE BIG PICTURE
REMAINS INTACT

It is naive to think that the ardent property rights advocates will read
Rachlinski's studies and go home without a fight. Although it seems
unlikely they will be able to produce an empirical study proving the opposite of his conclusion, I expect they will focus on nit-picking his study
in an attempt to discredit its conclusions. There are some legitimate concerns regarding Rachlinski's analysis, but in the long run they do not
appear to undermine his basic research design and conclusion. I will
now outline some of the more likely questions to be raised by his critics.
Plants are not animals. This charge is indisputable. It is not clear,
however, why landowners would respond differently to regulation of
plants than they would to regulation of animals. Indeed, most of the
restrictive effect associated with protection of animals is in reality about
plants-i.e., the animals' vegetative habitat.4 8 In Texas, for example,
47 Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 7.
48 Actions that do not result in direct

physical killing or injury to species are regulated
principally under the "harm" component of the take prohibition. The definition of "harm"
does not appear in the statute, but the FWS and the NMFS have provided a definition through
a regulation, including within the scope of the prohibited actions "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing esential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." Endangered and Threatened
Plants; Introduction and General Provisions; Definitions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975) (amended

Sept. 30, 1985). The Supreme Court has upheld that rule, focusing on the evidentiary aspects
of the "actually kills or injures" language as the key to keeping the scope of harm within the
legislatively intended meaning of take. See Babbitt,515 U.S. at 696-97 n.9. Indeed, the Court
went so far as to say that "every term in the regulation's definition of 'harm' is subservient to
the phrase 'an act which actually kills or injures wildlife."' Id. at 700 n.13. The Court ob-
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FWS focused its efforts on convincing landowners that they should not
impair vireo habitat.49 Rachlinski, by focusing on landowner response to
different levels of plant species protection regulation, offers a reliable
indicator of how landowners would respond to different levels of animal
species protection regulation.
Landowners may not know that plants are not protected. Rachlinski
surmises that perhaps landowners do not understand that the ESA treats
plants and animals differently. 50 If they believe plants receive full ESA
protection, this would undermine his premise that differences in plant
species' progress on different land regimes reflect differences in plant
species protection regulation levels. But while I know of no comprehensive qualitative research into landowner perceptions of how the ESA
treats plants, my experience is that most private landowners are shocked
to learn that the ESA mentions plants at all. In addition, landowners who
seek legal counsel generally ought to learn the way the statute works and
thus come to understand that the level of protection for plants varies as
Rachlinski describes.
The underlying FWS database usedfor the study is unreliable. It is
true that any empirical study is only as reliable as the data upon which it
is based. Rachlinski thus acknowledges that problems with the FWS's
access to private land, with the quality of data that the FWS receives
from other federal agencies, and with the way that the FWS interprets
post-listing discoveries of "new" populations of the species, may make
the database less than ideal for his purposes.51 But these are the best data
we have; therefore, any criticism on this ground ought to demonstrate the
data's unreliability before the study conclusion can be questioned. Indeed, if anything, this criticism indicates the need for more funding for
empirical research into the kinds of questions Rachlinski raises.
The study's federal land use classifications are too coarse. Rachlinski divides private landowner lands according to use, but divides federal lands according to management agency.5 2 As some federal land
management agencies control millions of acres of lands put to a variety
of uses, it would make the comparison more relevant if federal lands had
been divided according to use as well. It may be, for example, that a
served that the rule "did not need to include 'actually' to connote 'but for' causation, which the
other words of the definition obviously require." Id. The Court also emphasized that the harm
rule thus must "be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability." Id. at 697 n.9.
49 See CAMBELL, supra note 22, at 33-35 (reproducing the FWS's management guide-

lines for the black-capped vireo).
50 See Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 34.

51 See id. at 34-35.
52 See id at 21.
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species' status is consistent between federal and private land when uses
are held constant.
The study does not examine species status trends over time. Rachlinski's study depends on species assessments ("stable," "declining," and
"improving") that are snapshots in time rather than longitudinal. The
statement that a species is "stable" on federal property and "declining"
on private property today does not tell us much about how that condition
came to be. Was the species once abundant on federal land and abused
to the point that today a small remnant population is "stable" because the
federal authority is finally protecting it meaningfully? Is the species "declining" on private property, but declining slower than it was five years
ago? Without some historical perspective of this sort, the full story about
landowner behavior may not be reflected in the data.
Many species are affected by causes outside of the landowner's
control. The fact that a species is "declining" or "improving" on a particular property does not necessarily tell us what the property owner's
contribution to that condition has been. Invading species, offsite pollution sources, nearby urbanization, and other offsite forces can affect onsite conditions regardless of the property owner's land stewardship
ethic. 53 Federal lands may have an inherent advantage in this respect
given that they often appear in large isolated tracts that may be insulated
from outside threats. Blaming private property owners for offsite conditions seems unfair, and tightening land use restrictions on the property
owner will not avoid the problem, but will only exacerbate the
unfairness.
Even taking these criticisms into account, Rachlinski's study does
support the view that the likely consequence of completely eliminating
the ESA's land use restrictions for listed animal species would be to
drive more animal species into extinction. A few points of criticism appear to have some merit and may .warrant further study, but those points
go only to the strength of the conclusion, not its direction. As between
53 Examples of offsite forces taken from recent FWS actions include the following: the
Higginsi eye pearly mussel, which is threatened by the invasion of zebra mussels; the Bruneau
Hot Springsnail, which lives near hot springs outlets the flow of which is diminished by distant
agricultural pumping of the related aquifer; the Bog Turtle, which is threatened by, among
other things, habitat succession due to invasive species; and nine coastal plants found in central California, which are threatened by invasive plant species and natural plant community
succession. See Notice of Availability of a Draft Revised Recovery Plan for Higginsi Eye
Pearly Mussel, Lampsilis Higginsi, for Review and Comment, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,944 (1998);
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Notice of Determination to Retain Endangered Status for the Bruneau Hot Springsnail in Southwestern Idaho Under the Endangered
Species Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,981 (1998); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Final Rule to List the Northern Population of the Bog Turtle as Threatened Due to Similarity
of Appearance, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,605 (1997); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Endangered Status for Nine Plants from the Grasslands of Mesic Areas of the
Central Coast of California, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,791 (1997).
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the two possible outcomes of eliminating the ESA's land use restrictions,
Rachlinski has surely pointed us in the right direction; eliminating the
restrictions would lead generally to less conservation of species on private property.
CONCLUSION
Anyone with any practical experience working with the ESA knows
that only the intransigence of ardent property rights advocates necessitated someone like Rachlinski to assemble empirical proof for the proposition that landowners generally will not voluntarily protect endangered
species. That landowner behavior is as Rachlinski concludes seems intuitively obvious, but, in these times, airtight proof is essential when it
comes to debating ESA policy. Rachlinski has now given us that level of
proof. The free market assault on the core of the ESA is dead.
Rachlinski thus leaves me armed with only my anecdotes to support
the argument that the ESA can be unfair in some applications, and to
throw support toward what the FWS has done or proposed to do under
the CCA, Safe Harbor, and No Surprises policies to ameliorate unfairness. I believe these anecdotes expose the unfairness in the ESA and
reveal holes in Rachlinski's macro-data analysis of landowner-regulation
interaction. His study, aimed as it was at the extreme property rights
version of ESA reform, does not purport to deal with the timing and
location scenarios. An analysis of these scenarios suggests that the particular mix of species needs, habitat characteristics, and landowner behavior distort the ESA into an enemy of species conservation because of
its root unfairness issues. I confess that I also do not know, empirically
speaking, how big the holes are, how often they appear, or how best to
manage them and the ESA's unfairness through incentives, taxes, markets, or another method. Unfortunately, I am not up to the task of computing x2 values for landowner behavior in those settings. Perhaps
Rachlinski is ready for the third in his excellent series of empirical studies of the ESA.

